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One major criticism of universal basic income is that unconditional cash transfers
discourage recipients from working. We estimate the causal effects of a universal cash
transfer on short-run labor market activity by exploiting the timing and variation of a
long-running unconditional and universal transfer: Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend.
We find evidence of both a positive labor demand and negative labor supply response
to the transfers, document important heterogeneity across workers, and provide a set
of placebo tests supporting our main results. Altogether, a $1,000 increase in the
per-person disbursement leads to a 0.7% labor market contraction on an annual basis.
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1 Introduction
Universal Basic Income (UBI) constitutes an unconditional cash transfer that is provided
universally to all residents on a long-term basis, regardless of income and with no “strings
attached” (Marinescu, 2017). UBI has recently garnered considerable attention from pol-
icy makers, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, and politicians alike.1 Proponents favor UBI as a
replacement for existing welfare programs and consider it a promising route to address in-
equality (Murray, 2008; Thigpen, 2016). Although interest is high, we still know little about
the consequences and benefits of UBI as opportunities for empirical evaluation are rare.
One often-cited criticism of UBI is that the income effect of unconditional cash disburse-
ments provides a strong work disincentive (Robins, 1985).2 Because universal cash transfers
are rare in practice, most prior research has focused on labor-market responses to targeted
and/or conditional transfers, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Negative In-
come Tax Experiments (NIT), casino revenues, or lottery winnings, finding some evidence of
a small work disincentive (e.g., Munnell, 1987; Maynard and Murnane, 1979; Cesarini et al.,
2017; Price et al., 2016; Yang, 2018). Unlike means-based and conditional transfers, UBI
is given to the population at large, which is critical for at least two reasons. First, if labor
supply responses to transfers are heterogeneous, the average response of targeted populations
covered in prior research may not accurately reflect the average response across the entire
population. Second, the universal nature of UBI could lead to a positive demand shock
for consumption goods and services, providing upward pressure on the demand for labor
and offsetting any negative labor supply response. Because of these differences, conclusions
from research regarding non-universal transfers do not necessarily apply to universal transfer
1For example, several countries, such as Finland and India, have recently implemented UBI experiments.
Y Combinator Research, a nonprofit research lab in Silicon Valley, has recently undertaken a randomized
control trial aimed at understanding the effectiveness of universal income on well-being including employ-
ment, social networks, and health. On the political front, the Democratic Party nominee for the 2016 US
presidential election, Hillary Clinton, considered running on a platform whose central component was UBI.
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programs.
In this paper, we estimate the short-run labor-market effects of universal, unconditional,
and anticipated cash transfers from a long-running cash distribution program: the Alaska
Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD). The PFD is useful for making inference on potential
labor-market effects of UBI because it is a universal cash-transfer program: almost all Alaska
residents are eligible to receive the PFD, regardless of income. Furthermore, the annual dis-
tribution of the PFD is the single largest infusion of money into Alaska’s $55 billion economy,
and therefore, has the potential to generate a positive demand shock for consumption goods
and services.3 Indeed, Kueng (2018) finds that the average marginal propensity to consume
nondurable goods out of the PFD following the distribution is 24 cents per dollar, and 73
cents per dollar for total expenditures.
We focus on the short-run labor-market effects of the PFD for two reasons. First, esti-
mates of the long-term effects of the PFD also capture structural changes in the economy
that resulted from the program—i.e., long-run general equilibrium effects (Jones and Mari-
nescu, 2018). Focusing on short-term responses effectively controls for long-term structural
changes in the economy, thereby capturing pure labor-market responses. Moreover, focusing
on the short-run responses to universal income is relevant for testing for the presence of
PFD-driven demand shocks in the months following the disbursements (Kueng, 2018) and
testing the permanent income hypothesis (Yang, 2018). Second, identification of long-run
labor-market effects of the PFD is complicated by several confounding factors. Specifically,
the inaugural PFD disbursement in 1982 came just five years after the completion of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which had significant effects on the Alaskan labor market (Carring-
ton, 1996). The new revenue source also led to the repeal of the Alaska state income tax in
1980, immediately before the first PFD disbursement.4 These confounding factors make it
difficult to draw conclusions about the causal impact of the PFD on the labor market from
3In 2018, for example, the 1.022 billion dollar PFD distribution was about 51% of the construction sectors
GDP, or 44% of the retail sector’s.
4Alaska instituted a state income tax in 1949. At the time of the repeal in 1980, the tax had a progressive
structure with brackets ranging from 3% to 14.5% of personal income.
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long-run trends.
We use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1994-2017 and exploit
two exogenous sources of temporal variation to examine the PFD’s effect on labor-market
outcomes: the intra-annual g (Hsieh, 2003; Kueng, 2018), crime (Watson et al., 2019), and
long-run employment (Jones and Marinescu, 2018). The PFD is funded through a wealth
fund, not through taxes or reductions in public programs, so there is no offsetting effect on
demand for goods and services through other indirect channels. Over our sample period, all
PFD disbursements were made over a short period of time in the fall of the calendar year with
an average per person PFD of $1,750.5 Our identification strategy is based on the correlation
between the size of the per-person PFD and corresponding changes in employment and hours
worked around the PFD disbursement date.
We estimate that an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD leads to an average decrease
of 1.25 hours of work per week in the months following the PFD disbursement in the sample of
employed women. However, we find no significant impact on the probability of employment
for the population of women. Our estimates are inclusive of both labor supply and demand
responses; thus, we interpret the negative intensive margin response with no corresponding
extensive margin effects as evidence of a labor supply response to the cash distribution. In
contrast, for the sample of men, we estimate that an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD
leads to a 1.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of employment in the months
following the disbursement with no statistically significant change in hours worked. We
consider this positive short-run effect on male employment to be the most direct evidence
to date of a labor demand shock induced by universal cash disbursements.
Altogether, our results suggest that an increase in the PFD induces both a positive labor
demand shock and a negative labor supply response. Combining the extensive and intensive
margin estimates, we find that an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD results in a 1.6%
labor market contraction in the months following the disbursement, or a 0.7% contraction
5In 2016 dollars. This is the per-person transfer, so a family of four was eligible for $7,000, on average.
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on an annual basis.
To verify that our estimated labor-market response is driven by the PFD, we conduct
placebo tests based on a reference distribution of state-specific estimates for the rest of
the U.S., which does not receive the PFD. The intuition for this comparison is that we do
not expect the PFD to have a causal effect on the labor markets of other states; thus, if
our estimated effects are indeed driven by the PFD, they should be extreme, relative to the
reference distribution of non-Alaskan effects. The estimates for Alaska for both hours of work
(women) and employment (men) are more extreme than any other state-specific estimate,
which provides strong support that our estimates reflect the effect of the PFD transfer on
the Alaskan labor market.
We evaluate the role of heterogeneity by comparing responses across several important
dimensions. Our findings confirm the importance of heterogeneity as the negative intensive-
margin response is largest among younger, lower-wage earning women with young children
in the household. Our ability to test for heterogeneous responses across the entire income
distribution highlights one benefit of evaluating a universal transfer such as the PFD and
validates concerns about using targeted transfers, such as EITC, to inform UBI policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion
of the relevant literature, the history of the Alaska PFD, and why the PFD provides a useful
setting for UBI research. Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and empirical strategy. We
discuss results in Section 5. The implications of our findings and conclusions are discussed
in the final two sections.
2 Background
2.1 Related Literature
Our research contributes to the broader literature on the behavioral effects of unconditional
cash transfers, which is critical for designing UBI-related policy. Marinescu (2017) provides
4
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a thorough review of the labor-market effects of unconditional cash transfers, such as the
NIT Experiments, the Eastern Cherokee Nations casino revenue dividend, lottery winnings,
and the PFD. The NIT Experiments provided guaranteed income to primarily low-income
households. In the most generous of the NIT Experiments,6 Price et al. (2016) estimate a 3.3
percentage-point decrease in the probability of employment and a 7.4% earnings reduction.
However, the NIT treatment was not permanent (recipients knew that the payments were
temporary) and had a high implicit income tax rate, thereby inducing both an income and
substitution effect. It is thus challenging to compare the NIT Experiments to an established
unconditional cash transfer program such as the PFD, which is guaranteed and induces only
an income effect.7
There is some evidence that individuals reduce labor supply and earnings in response
to winning the lottery (Cesarini et al., 2017; Imbens et al., 2001; Sila and Sousa, 2014).
However, the more modest transfers of casino revenues disbursed to the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians (around $4,000 in two installments per year starting in 1997) were found
to have no discernible impact on recipients’ labor supply (Akee et al., 2010). While lottery
winnings and casino revenues have the benefit of constituting a pure income effect, there are
still important differences in the structure of the payments and the number of recipients that
make it difficult to compare these cash transfers directly to the PFD. Importantly, in each of
these settings, the distributions are to a relatively small proportion of the population, which
means they are unlikely to induce the demand shock that we might expect from a universal
transfer (Marinescu, 2017).
Two papers that are closely related to our study examine the long-run (Jones and Mari-
nescu, 2018) and short-run (Feinberg and Kuehn, 2018) labor-market responses to the Alaska
PFD disbursements. Jones and Marinescu (2018) estimate the long-run labor market im-
pacts of the PFD using a synthetic-control design, which uses a weighted average of control
6The Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiment
7Additionally, under-reporting of earnings partially explains the employment reduction from the NIT
Experiments (Burtless, 1986).
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states to estimate the counterfactual labor-market outcomes in Alaska in the absence of the
PFD program. The study finds no evidence of a PFD effect on employment, but finds a
small increase in the share of workers in part-time jobs, which is interpreted as evidence
of a reduction in labor supply on the intensive margin. Jones and Marinescu (2018) also
provide evidence of a decline in employment in tradable sectors with no corresponding ef-
fect in non-tradable sectors, which they interpret as evidence of a labor-demand shock for
non-tradables. Jones and Marinescu (2018) thus provide some evidence of a long-run gen-
eral equilibrium effect from the PFD; however, as discussed previously, long-run estimates
of the PFD should be considered cautiously given the existence of confounding factors that
had considerable effects on the labor market in Alaska around the time that the PFD was
instituted (Carrington, 1996).
Feinberg and Kuehn (2018) estimate the short-run effects of the PFD on the labor market
using inter-annual variation in the size of the PFD and annual data based on usual hours and
weeks of work from the American Community Survey (ACS). The study finds evidence of
significant negative labor-market elasticities with respect to the PFD: -0.10, -0.11, and -0.11
for men, single women, and married women, respectively. Our empirical design differs consid-
erably from the short-run analysis by Feinberg and Kuehn (2018). We use the intra-annual
timing of the PFD disbursement to focus on changes in the labor market in a short window
around the time of the disbursement, whereas Feinberg and Kuehn (2018) use annual data
from the ACS, for which the reported hours of work do not align with the PFD disbursement
dates. Further, Feinberg and Kuehn (2018) construct family-specific PFD disbursements to
use as the right-hand-side variable of interest. However, information on individual eligibility
and disbursements cannot be elicited from survey data used by Feinberg and Kuehn (2018),
leading to error in the right-hand-side variable of interest. Finally, the inclusion of year
fixed effects in their model specification, which are collinear with the individual size of PFD
payments, means that their estimated labor-market responses are driven by differences in
family-size, which is likely endogenous. Because neither ACS or CPS data are well-suited
6
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to accurately construct the size of household PFD disbursements, we focus on year-to-year
changes in the size of the per-person PFD. While our strategy does not separate the demand
and supply side responses, neither the ACS or CPS data are suited to isolate the supply-side
income effects.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on behavioral responses to other types of
transfers (e.g., means tested, Moffitt, 2016). In a recent analysis of the short-term labor
supply responses to EITC payments, Yang (2018) estimates that for an additional $1,000
received in EITC, married women reduce their proportion of weeks worked by 2.7% in the
month of the transfer. In contrast, our estimated reduction in hours worked for the sample
of women equates to a 1.2% decrease for an additional $1,000 transfer to the household.
While the focus on the immediate response to the EITC makes the setting in Yang (2018)
more comparable to our analysis of the PFD, direct comparison of our estimates is difficult
because EITC payments are targeted toward low-income households, do not generally induce
pure income effects, and are substantially smaller than PFD transfers.8,9
2.2 The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
The annual PFD is paid to Alaska residents from the investment earnings of the state’s
sovereign wealth fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund. The Fund was established via a con-
stitutional amendment in 1976 to save and invest a portion of the annual mineral royalties
with the purpose of diversifying Alaska’s revenue stream, preserving mineral wealth for fu-
ture residents, and ensuring that royalties were not spent haphazardly by politicians. The
Fund’s value currently stands at over 63 billion dollars. Distributing dividends from the fund
was not part of the initial plan but changed with Governor Hammond’s desire to ensure the
8The average EITC transfer for the married sample in Yang (2018) was about $2,836, whereas a family
of the same size was eligible for a PFD of $7,266 on average over our sample period based on an average
number of eligible children of 2.2. Both numbers are in 2016 dollars. The average predicted EITC of $2,450
in Yang (2018) is measured in 2007 dollars.
9Comparing our estimates to Yang (2018) is also complicated by differences in outcomes measures. Yang
(2018) focuses on the proportion of weeks worked in a given month, which only captures reductions that
decrease hours in a given week to zero.
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sustainability of the Fund by involving the public. The first payout of $1,000 was made in
1982.
PFD payments were initially paid out of the general fund in the first year of the program;
however, payments have since been determined by a formula that is based on an average
of the Fund’s income over five years in order to produce more stable dividend amounts
from year to year. The fund is currently well diversified with 26 of the 63 billion dollars
in stocks, and the rest in bonds, real-estate, private equity, and other asset classes. While
the fund was originally capitalized by state oil revenue, investment returns are the main
growth mechanism. Specifically, Watson et al. (2019) note that since 1985, only 2-3% of
the annual growth comes from state oil revenues, whereas the rest of the growth is from
reinvested earnings. Given this investment profile, returns are not reflective of Alaska’s
economic conditions, which are heavily tied to oil prices and production. The Fund is
managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) and operated as a public
trust, much like trust funds established for pension funds. This means fund managers must
balance the idea of income production against ordinary prudence about risk.
The dividend established an income floor for the state’s residents. This cash transfer
is particularly important in rural areas where economies lack economic bases and are still
a mixture of subsistence and a small formal economy. Alaskans have received the yearly
dividend since 1982, with the amount varying on an annual basis depending on the Funds
returns. In 2008, the dividend reached a high of $3,269 (including a one-time supplement of
$1,200 “energy rebate” financed by that years state budget surplus), which comes to $13,076
for a family of four. The program has become very popular and the public expects it to
run in perpetuity. PFD payments are not based on a person’s income or wealth and are
distributed to all residents—adults and children–of the state (including green-card holders
and refugees), making it nearly universal. The dividend represents a non-negligible portion of
Alaskans’ earnings. The 1982 dividend distribution of $450 million amounted to 6.3 percent
of personal income in Alaska, the same amount as the payroll of the petroleum industry for
8
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that year. The average annual aggregate distribution is similar in size to the payroll of many
sectors in the Alaska economy. In 2017, for example, the 651 million dollar distribution was
almost exactly the same as the manufacturing sector’s payroll, or 57% of the construction
sector’s. The PFD also has the unique distinction of being distributed over a short period
of time, resulting in it being the most significant concentrated cash distribution.
It is important to note that the decision to distribute payments in October is a result
of administrative processes, as opposed to any intention on behalf of the founders of the
dividend. Most Alaskans—84.17% in 2017—receive their PFDs through direct deposit in
the first week of October, while the rest received mailed checks. Over our study period
(1994-2017), direct deposits have always been issued either before or on the same day that
the first checks are mailed.
3 Data
We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) basic monthly survey (Flood et al., 2018)
supplemented with information on the annual PFD size and disbursement date to estimate
the short-run impact of disbursement on the labor market. The CPS is well suited to measure
short-run fluctuations in the labor market since the survey is given each month to a large
number of respondents, and finding an adequate sample size for the Alaskan labor market is
challenging. We focus on two measures of the labor market: the number of hours worked in
the reference week and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was employed
in the reference week.10 We use these two measures to estimate responses along the intensive
and extensive margins, respectively. To focus on working-age individuals who are likely to
receive the PFD, we restrict our sample to respondents age 20 to 55 who are either the head
of the household or the spouse to the head of the household. We exclude cohabiting couples
in our final sample. Finally, we drop those who are not US citizens.11
10Hours are top-coded at 80 hours per week.
11Citizenship is not required to receive the PFD, but a smaller proportion of non-citizens will be eligible.
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4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits two sources of temporal variation in the PFD. First, we use
the discrete intra-annual variation created by the timing of the PFD distribution by compar-
ing labor-market outcomes from the months immediately following the PFD disbursement
to the months prior to the PFD disbursement. Previous work has demonstrated that there
are significant behavioral responses in consumption (Kueng, 2018) and crime (Watson et al.,
2019) immediately following the PFD disbursement. The time of year in which the PFD is
issued is a useful source of variation because it is determined only by administrative pro-
cesses. Unfortunately, despite this useful feature, we cannot rely solely on the timing of the
PFD to identify the PFD’s effect on labor-market outcomes because of seasonal trends in
the Alaskan labor market.
One potential solution is to use the labor markets of other U.S. states—which do not
receive the PFD—as an estimate of the counterfactual of the Alaska labor-market in the
absence of the PFD. However, as we demonstrate below, other states are not adequate
controls for Alaska because they exhibit considerably different seasonal trends from Alaska.
Instead, we exploit a second source of temporal variation in the PFD: inter-annual variation
in the size of the PFD payment. As we demonstrate below, Alaska labor-market trends are
very similar in low- and high-PFD years during the pre-disbursement months, suggesting
that deviations in labor-market trends in the post-disbursement months arise solely from
differences in the size of the PFD.
Our empirical strategy leads to a DiD-type estimator, using differences around the timing
of the disbursements and heterogeneity in the size of the disbursements, for identification.
Finally, we supplement our within-state analysis with a placebo test that leverages the fact
that labor markets in other states should be unaffected by the PFD, and thus, serve as a
useful reference distribution under the null hypothesis that the PFD has no effect on the
Alaskan labor market.
10
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4.1 Labor market seasonality
Figure 1 displays average hours worked by month in Alaska and the rest of the United States.
Seasonality in the Alaskan labor market differs from the average state: the average number
of hours worked increases considerably during the summer months in Alaska, particularly
for men, whereas hours worked during the summer months noticeably decreases across the
rest of the U.S. In addition, the average hours worked is lower in Alaska than in the average
state in both the male and female subsamples. While the contrast is less stark in the sample
of women, there is a noticeable dip in the average hours worked in Alaska, relative to the
national average, in the beginning and end of the calendar year. Panel (C) of Figure 1
displays the average seasonality in employment in the Alaskan labor market as percentage
growth from January of the same year, relative to the average state (BLS, 2018). In an
average year, the Alaskan labor market is roughly 15% larger in July and August, relative to
January. The average among the rest of the states, in contrast, is less than 5%. While this
figure masks some state-to-state heterogeneity, there is no other state with similarly drastic
seasonal fluctuations in labor market size as Alaska.
Because of the drastic differences in seasonality between Alaska and the rest of the coun-
try, other states are not suitable controls for a within-year difference-in-differences (DiD)
estimation strategy around the PFD disbursement. We would risk attributing differences in
seasonality to the PFD disbursement.
4.2 Inter-annual variation in the size of the PFD
Instead of using other U.S states as a control for Alaska, we focus on year-to-year variation
in the Alaska labor market and its association with the size of the PFD. To demonstrate,
Figure 2 separates the seasonal patterns in Alaska and other states by high and low PFD
years.12 The Alaska labor market is slightly larger in high PFD years in every month, but the
12Table A1 displays annual statistics related to the PFD. High PFD years are defined as years with a
per-person PFD over $1,700 and low PFD years had a per person PFD below $1,600
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difference is essentially a parallel shift. The size of labor markets in other states appears un-
related, on average, by whether it is a high or low PFD year, although there exist differences
that are masked by state-to-state heterogeneity. Figure 3 graphs the difference in average
hours between high and low PFD years for Alaska and three potential control groups: all
other states, states with the most comparable seasonal employment patterns to Alaska, and
energy states.13 The relatively flat line around zero among the three potential control groups
in the sample of men (Panel A) and women (Panel B) suggests there is little difference in
hours worked per week between high and low PFD years. In both cases, the patterns among
the potential control groups highlight an important point: after leveraging heterogeneity in
the PFD size across years in the Alaskan market, differencing out the analogous changes in
the corresponding control group does not add any useful variation—i.e., using other states
as control groups essentially leaves our estimates unaffected. Instead, we use other states
to produce two placebo tests, which we discuss in greater detail below, that provide further
evidence that our estimates reflect the effect of the transfer on the Alaskan labor market.
Focusing on the differences in hours in the sample of Alaskan men in high and low PFD
years (Figure 3), the lines evolve similarly through the first four months of the year. There
is a slight positive change in May through July, followed by a steep decline in August to
December in the high PFD years, relative to low PFD years. In fact, the steep decline in
the Alaskan labor market in high PFD years in the second half of the year can be seen in
both panels, which means that there is an unconditional decline in hours worked among the
sample in high PFD years, relative to low PFD years. Among the sample of women, the
decline coincides almost perfectly with the usual first disbursement of the PFD in October,
which suggests that we would estimate a decline in hours worked among that sample if using
an unconditional DiD estimation strategy. While there is also a decline in the sample of men,
the decline starts prior to the disbursement and there is only a sharp decline in November
13The most seasonally comparable states (MT, WY, SD, and ME) were chosen in an ad hoc manner based
on average seasonal fluctuations and in which months each state experiences high and low periods. Energy
states are based on Snead (2009).
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- December. It is thus less obvious that there is a strong unconditional correlation between
the PFD size and hours worked in this sample.
The similarity between high and low PFD years in the pre-disbursement months is further
demonstrated in Table A2, which presents sample averages for men and women for labor-
market, demographic, and economic variables. In general, the samples from high- and low-
PFD years are comparable, with two exceptions: both the average Alaska unemployment
rate and the crude oil price are slightly higher in low-PFD years. As previously discussed,
the size of the PFD in any given year is reflective of national, rather than state, trends,
because the fund is invested in a diverse set of assets with very little connection to the
Alaska economy. We condition on the monthly unemployment rate and crude oil prices in
all specifications discussed below. We discuss testing pre-trends of labor market outcomes
in the next section.
4.3 Estimation
We first estimate month-specific impacts of a $1,000 increase in the per-person PFD payment
on labor market outcomes based on Equation 1, which includes interaction terms between
month-specific dummy variables and the per-person PFD disbursement in a given year:
Limy = α +
∑
m
βm · PFDy ·Mm + Γ ·Ximy + Yy +Mm + εimy, (1)
where Limy is the outcome of interest (i.e., the number of hours worked or a dummy variable
for employment) for individual i in month m and year y. PFDy is the size of the per-person
PFD in thousands of dollars. Yy and Mm represent year and month dummy variables,
respectively. In this specification, the year subscript y refers to a twelve-month period from
April to March of the following year, rather than a calendar year. Similarly, in January
through March, PFDy denotes the PFD from the fall of the prior calendar year. By shifting
the window in this way, we are estimating the influence of the PFD on the labor market
13
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from the time of the disbursement - usually in October - all the way to the following March.
We do this to check the persistence of the labor market responses to the PFD disbursement.
The coefficients of interest are the β̂m, which represent the month-specific impacts of
a $1,000 increase in the size of the per-person PFD, after conditioning on our full set of
controls, Ximy, Yy, and Mm.
14 The identifying variation is based on the association between
the within-year variation in labor-market outcomes around the PFD disbursement and the
size of the per-person PFD in that year.
Equation 1 amounts to an event-study analysis, comparing month-specific relationships
with the PFD size and hours or employment around the disbursement of the PFD. In each
regression, we omit the interaction with the August dummy variable, so the differences are
relative to August.15 Estimates in the months before the PFD disbursement act as a test
for pre-trends in the outcomes of interest: if the estimated effects are near zero in the pre-
disbursement period, it suggests that the labor market outcomes in the months leading up
to the disbursement are uncorrelated with the size of the upcoming PFD that has not yet
been disbursed. Estimates in the months following the disbursement represent responses to
a $1,000 increase in the size of the per-person PFD. By extending the post-disbursement
window to track the potential responses through March of the following calendar year, we
demonstrate both the short-term response to the disbursements and the fade-out of the
effects over time.
To estimate the average effect over the months following the disbursements, we focus on
estimates from the specification in Equation 2:
14Ximy includes a marriage indicator, age and age-squared, dummy variables for the number of children
5 years or younger in the household, dummy variables for the number of children in the household, income
category indicators ($25-50k, $50-75k, $75-150, over $150k), dummies for being top coded at $75k and
$150k, a dummy for missing values, a dummy for living in a metropolitan area, dummies for educational
attainment (high school, some college, a college degree, or an advanced degree), race and ethnicity, the
state unemployment rate by month, and crude oil price by month. Broad industry and occupation dummy
variables are also included in the hours of work regressions.
15In most years, the initial PFD disbursement takes place in early October, but the earliest disbursement
in our sample is in September.
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Limy = α + β · Pimy · PFDy + γ · Pimy + Γ ·Ximy + Yy +Mm + εimy, (2)
where Pimy is a dummy variable indicating observations in the months following the disburse-
ment in a given twelve month period, and all other variables have the same definition from
Equation 1. In this case, β̂ represents the average impact of a $1,000 increase in the size of
the per-person PFD across the post-disbursement months. We use Equation 2 to summarize
the average relationship of the PFD on labor-market outcomes and test the null hypothesis
that the PFD distribution has no influence on labor-market outcomes. We determine the
length of the post-disbursement period based on the evidence on fade-out that we estimate
using Equation 1, and we allow this to differ for men and women.
In every case, we use per-person PFD, PFDy, to estimate labor-market impacts. We do
this for a couple of reasons. First, we do not have credible information on the actual size of the
PFD that each respondent received. Although roughly 90% of the state population receives
a PFD, some respondents may not be eligible. Second, specific PFD amounts depend on the
dates that residents moved to the state and/or on birth dates for individuals less than one
year old, further complicating our ability to accurately measure the household PFD. While
using the per-person measurement may slightly change the interpretation of our estimates,
it does not invalidate our estimates. In fact, we believe this is more credible than some other
measures. For example, using mis-measured family size and/or income measures (to use a
PFD-to-income ratio) introduces error in our variable of interest that we are able to avoid
in our preferred specification. Income is not generally measured with accuracy in the CPS,
and because we make use of the basic monthly survey, we have even less precise measures of
income. Nonetheless, annual variation in per-person PFD size is still useful for identifying
the impact of the PFD on the labor market.
We include two placebo tests to provide further evidence that our estimates reflect the
effect of the transfer on the Alaskan labor market. First, we estimate state-specific effects for
all other states based on Equation 2, and compare the density of non-Alaska treatment effects
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with our main estimates. If our findings are driven by the PFD disbursements, which are not
made in any other state, then we should not expect the PFD to have any effect on the labor
markets of other states. Placing our estimates in the density of placebo treatment effects
essentially tells us how likely we would be to recover similarly sized estimates under the null
hypothesis that the PFD has no effect on the Alaskan labor market. We extend this concept
to compare month-specific estimates for the impact of an additional $1,000 in the per-person
PFD on the labor market in Alaska with month-specific placebo-effect distributions. To do
this, we estimate the analogous β̂m for every state based on Equation 1 and compare the
month-specific point estimates for Alaska with the distributions of month-specific estimates
for all other states.
Additionally, we evaluate heterogeneous responses to the PFD, which highlight the sub-
groups that are most responsive to the PFD. We estimate heterogeneous responses across
several important dimensions, including marital status, age, whether or not the respondent
has any children or any children age 5 or younger in the household, and full- and part-
time worker status. We do this by splitting the sample and re-estimating the impact of
the disbursement in each subsample.16 Our heterogeneity analysis helps us reconcile any
differences between our estimates and those from previous literature, and can guide future
implementations of universal income trials.
Finally, we estimate heterogeneous responses in hours of work by wage terciles. Because
we do not have valid wages for all respondents, we use regression-based imputation to impute
wages for a portion of the sample based on the sample with valid wages (similar to Blau
and Kahn, 2007). Using the sample of observations that report valid wages, i.e. the non-
self-employed outgoing rotation group, we estimate wage regressions for male and female
respondents separately.17 We use the estimated coefficients from the wage regressions to
16When estimating heterogeneous responses in the probability of employment by FT/PT, we focus on
relative shifts in employment. To do this, we use dummy variables that indicate employment in FT or PT
work and restrict to the sample of employed workers.
17Controlling for a quadratic in age by month of year, quadratic in age by year, educational attainment
dummies by month and year, a part-time worker dummy by month, industry by occupation dummies, and
industry and occupation dummies by month and year.
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predict wages for the rest of our sample, and split the samples into terciles based on imputed
or real wages.18 It is important to note that error in the imputed wages is less problematic,
because we are not relying on precise wage measures. We are much less likely to mis-classify
a worker into the wrong tercile, than we are to mis-measure the wage.
5 Results
We first present the main results from estimating the month-specific and average effects of
the increase in the per person PFD on the probability of employment and hours of work. We
then present the placebo tests based on comparing our main estimates with the reference
distribution of placebo effects from untreated states. Next, we consider potential differ-
ences in part- and full-time work and analyze heterogeneous effects across several important
characteristics. Section 5.2 shows estimated impacts by marital status, age, the presence of
children in the household, and the presence of children under the age of five in the household.
Because of the contrast in the main estimates presented from the sample of men and women,
we again discuss results for the two samples separately. In section 5.2.3, we show estimated
effects of the PFD on hours worked by wage terciles. Finally, in section 5.3, we combine the
intensive- and extensive-margin effects to produce an estimated effect of the PFD on the
total amount of labor.
5.1 Main Results
Figure 4 is a graphic depiction of the estimates obtained from Equation 1, providing a
monthly comparison of the impact of an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD, relative
to the difference in August. Each panel displays the estimated effects for a different group
and outcome combination. For example, Panel (A) displays the estimated effects of an
additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD on the hours worked in the sample of women. The
18In the cases with valid wages, we use the reported wage.
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vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the
household level. In all four panels, the pre-PFD estimates are mostly near zero, suggesting
that the size of the PFD is unrelated to the employment outcomes in the months before the
disbursement. In fact, every 95% confidence interval over the pre-disbursement period in
Figure 4 includes zero.
Panel (A) of Figure 4 highlights a noticeable dip in the post-PFD period in the sample of
women, suggesting that a larger PFD disbursement decreases hours of work in the months
following the disbursement. The decline starts soon after the disbursement and persists until
February of the following year. Panel (B) displays the results from the analogous exercise
using an employment indicator as the outcome variable. As such, Panel (B) displays the
average conditional monthly difference in the proportion of the population of women that
are employed for a $1,000 increase in the per-person PFD. In contrast to Panel (A), there
is no noticeable change in the probability of employment around the disbursement among
women, suggesting that a larger PFD does not impact the probability of working in this
sample.
The analogous estimates for the sample of men are displayed in Panels (C) and (D) of
Figure 4. Panel (C) shows the month-specific effects of a $1,000 increase in the per-person
PFD on the hours of work among men. Hours of work among men is seemingly unrelated to
the size of the PFD, as every estimate—including estimates for post-disbursement months—is
near zero. From Panel (D), we find that the relative probability of employment in the sample
of men is unrelated to the size of the PFD in April through August; however, there is a visible
incline in employment following the disbursement with statistically significant increases in
November and December, which suggests that the proportion of the population that reports
being employed in post-PFD months is increasing in the size of the PFD payment. Since the
differences represented in the figure are inclusive of both labor supply and demand responses,
a positive impact suggests that the PFD induced a labor-demand shock that is large enough
to outweigh any supply response in this sample along the extensive margin.
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Next, we report estimates of β from Equation 2 in Table 1. Columns (1) - (2) report the
estimated average impact of an additional $1,000 in the size of the per-person PFD on the
probability of employment during the post-disbursement months.19 In column 1, we see that
an increase of $1,000 in the per-person PFD increases the probability of employment in the
male subsample by 1.7 percentage points, which is a two-percent increase over the baseline
employment for men of 87% (Table A2). The increase in male employment is consistent
with a demand shock stemming from the PFD and suggests that the positive demand shock
outweighs any negative supply response to receiving the PFD. This seems plausible, given the
low supply response of male workers to income and wages found in previous literature.20 In
contrast, we find no significant impact of the disbursement on the probability of employment
among the sample of women (column 2).
Estimates of the intensive-margin responses to the PFD are provided in columns (3) -
(4) of Table 1, which report the impact of an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD on
the number of hours worked per week (conditional on being employed). For the sample of
men (column 3), an additional $1,000 leads to a reduction of 0.27 hours per week; however,
this estimate is statistically insignificant at the 10% level. For the sample of women (column
4), an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD leads to a decrease of about 1.26 hours per
week, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Given the average of 24.6 hours per
week in this sample and the average per-person PFD of $1,750 (2016 dollars), the estimate
amounts to a reduction of over five percent in hours worked and an elasticity of -0.09, which
is reasonable when compared with labor supply responses to EITC payments (Yang, 2018).21
19From Figure 4, the response for men fades out by January; thus, the post-disbursement window includes
the post-disbursement months up to (and including) December. For women, responses persist through
February of the following calendar year, so the post-disbursement window includes the post-disbursement
months up to (and including) February.
20For example, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a review of labor supply estimates, Nichols and
Rothstein (2015) and Yang (2018) for evidence on differential responses to the EITC, and Robins (1985) for
evidence related to the NIT experiments.
21The elasticity should be considered in context of our estimation strategy. By using all post-PFD months
as a single treatment period, we are implicitly allowing the response to persist through February. Thus,
this elasticity captures an average response that persists for about five months (the first disbursement is in
October in all but one year). In addition, the estimated elasticity in (Yang, 2018) combines the intensive
and extensive margin, which we explore in more depth in section 5.3.
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Figure A1 displays the placebo effect densities generated from estimating the effect of an
additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD on hours and employment in all untreated states.
Comparing our main estimates with the placebo densities provides strong evidence that the
estimated effects on the Alaskan labor market are actually driven by the PFD. For example,
our main estimate that an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD reduces hours among
women by -1.26 hours per week is supported by the fact that there is no other state for
which we could replicate an estimate of this size. In addition, the density of placebo effects
is centered around zero, which confirms that including other states as control units would
have little impact on the main estimates. In Panel (D) we show that the estimated effect of
the PFD on employment among men in Alaska is also the highest of any state. In the other
two cases, employment among women and hours among men, the estimates are well within
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the placebo distributions. As with the previous two cases,
both placebo-effect densities are centered around zero.
We present the month-specific effects of the PFD relative to the placebo densities in
Figure 5, which provide further evidence that our main results are truly a reflection of
the PFD disbursements. In Panel (A) of Figure 5, the only month-specific effects on hours
worked among women that fall outside of the 5th - 95th percentile range of placebo estimates
are for those months that occur after (or during) the first PFD distribution in every year
of our sample (October through February). Similarly for male employment, the estimated
effects in November and December are well outside of the 5th - 95th percentile range of
the placebo distribution. On the other hand, the month-specific estimates for employment
among women and hours worked among male are all between the 5th and 95th percentile of
the corresponding reference distributions. These patterns provide convincing evidence that
support our main results, as they confirm that the timing of the responses correspond with
the timing of the treatment and show that we could not replicate our findings using labor
market activity from any other state.
Table 2 presents estimates of differential responses in employment and hours worked by
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full- and part-time work status. When estimating heterogeneous responses in the probability
of employment, we restrict the sample to employed respondents and use dummy variables
for full-time or part-time employment as the outcome variable. This is helpful for interpre-
tation, as the estimates in Panel (A) of Table 2 can be interpreted as relative movement
toward or away from a type of work. For example, the estimated change in the probability
of employment for full-time male workers is a decline of 0.6 percentage points, and the es-
timated change for part-time work is a 0.6 percentage point increase. We interpret this as
a relative shift toward part-time work. However, it does not indicate that full-time employ-
ment declined in absolute terms, as overall employment increased among this group. Neither
estimate is significantly different from zero. Similarly, neither of the estimated changes in
hours worked are statistically different from zero in the sample of men.
In contrast, there is a stronger shift toward part-time work among the sample of women.
We estimate a relative shift toward part-time work of 0.021, which means that there is a 2.1
percentage point increase in the proportion of all workers in part-time jobs (column 4 Panel
A), which is statistically significant at the five percent level. We also find some intensive-
margin differences in the sample of women. We estimate a strong decline in the hours worked
among full-time workers of -1.084 hours per week, which is statistically significant at the one-
percent level. On the other hand, we find no statistically significant change in the hours of
part-time workers.
5.2 Heterogeneity by Age and Children
5.2.1 Men
Panel (A) of Table 3 shows that the magnitude of the increase in the probability of employ-
ment is larger among single men and men without children in the household. We estimate
that an additional $1,000 in the size of the per-person PFD increases the probability of
employment by 2.5 percentage points among single men, but the estimate is statistically
insignificant. Among men with no children in the household, the probability of employment
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increases by 2.7 percentage points, which is a statistically significant increase at the five
percent level. We find little evidence of heterogeneous effects in the probability of employ-
ment by age. The estimated effects on the intensive margin, hours worked (Panel B), are all
negative, with the exception of the sample of men with children under 5 in the household.
However, we find no statistically significant effect on hours worked in any subsample, sug-
gesting that there is no sample in which the disbursement leads to a reduction in the total
amount of labor. Instead, particularly in samples with a strong increase in the employment
probability, there is an apparent increase in the total amount of labor.
5.2.2 Women
In contrast to men, we find no statistically significant increases in the probability of em-
ployment in any of the subsamples of women (Panel A of Table 4) However, we estimate a
statistically significant decrease in the probability of employment among women with children
under age 5 in the household. We also estimate a relatively large decrease of 1.9 percentage
points in the employment probability of women under age 30. However, the estimate is not
statistically different from zero.
On the other hand, there is an across-the-board reduction in hours worked, as the estimate
for each subsample is statistically different from zero at conventional levels. We find little
evidence of differences in the response of women by marital status.22 In contrast, the sample
of women under 30 are much more responsive than women age 31 - 55. We also find that
women with children in the household respond more than women without a child in the
household, with estimated decreases of 1.5 and 1 hours, respectively. The contrast between
women with and without a child age five or younger in the household is even more stark, as
women with a young children in the home decrease hours of work by more than 2.1 hours
per week in the months following the disbursement. The strong response of women with
22The decrease in hours among single and married women, respectively, amounts to a 3 and 4 percent
reduction in hours worked, relative baseline average of 37 and 33 hours per week. The approximate elasticities
are therefore -0.05 and -0.09.
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young children in the household highlights one potential benefit of the disbursement that
may not be captured by considering labor market responses in isolation. If this time is re-
allocated toward children in the household, it could lead to long-run benefits on the child’s
development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Bettinger et al., 2014; Cunha et al., 2006;
Coneus et al., 2012).
5.2.3 Heterogeneity in Hours by Wage Level
Figure 6 displays the estimated effects of an additional $1,000 dollars in the per-person PFD
on hours of work for six different subsamples: male and female samples by low, medium,
and high wage levels. Each point represents the estimated effect for a different subsample
based on our main specification. The strongest negative response is from the sample of
women in the lowest wage tercile, for whom we estimate a reduction of 2 hours per week,
which is significant at the one-percent level. This might not be surprising since the PFD
represents a larger portion of total income for this group. However, we do not observe this
response among the sample of men in the lowest wage tercile. Neither women or men in
the middle tercile appear responsive to the increased disbursement. However, we estimate
a decrease of 1.3 hours per week (significant at the five-percent level) among women in the
high wage tercile, which is consistent with the responsiveness of consumption to the PFD
among high-income individuals, as found by Kueng (2018). We do not find a statistically
significant response in any of the male subsamples.
5.3 Combined Intensive and Extensive Margin Effects
To help evaluate the economic significance of the estimated responses to PFD disbursements,
we compare the potentially offsetting effects of the disbursement on the intensive and ex-
tensive margins. For example, our analysis finds that an increase in the per-person PFD
leads to an increase in the probability of being employed for men, but a slight statistically
insignificant decrease in the hours of work for those employed. In this case, there are coun-
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teracting influences on the aggregate amount of labor. To interpret the relative importance
of intensive and extensive margin effects and evaluate the overall impact of the PFD on the
size of the market, we write the average hours of work across the population in terms of
the probability of employment and the conditional average hours of work. Taking the total






× Avg(Hrs|Empl.) + dAvg(Hrs|Empl.)
dPFD
× Pr(Empl.)
= βe × Avg(Hrs|Empl.) + βh × Prob(Empl.).
This expression allows us to measure the total change in hours worked as a function of our
estimated effects on employment and hours, β̂e and β̂h, while decomposing the potentially
conflicting forces on the two margins. The decrease in conditional hours worked suggests
that the average worker reduces labor by 0.28 hours per week, or β̂h × Prob(Empl.) =
(−0.28)× (0.85) = −0.24 on the average male. On the other hand, the positive employment
effect can be calculated as β̂e × Avg(Hours|Employed) = (0.0165) × (41.44) = 0.68. This
suggests that the average overall impact on labor among males in this sample is actually
positive: −0.24 + 0.68 = 0.44 (p-value= 0.27).23
For the sample of women, we know the overall impact is negative since we find both a
decrease in the average number of hours worked per week and a statistically insignificant
decrease in the probability of employment in the months after the PFD is distributed. The
analogous calculations suggests that the average total effect for the sample of women is
(−1.25)× (0.73) + (−0.006)× (34.67) = −0.91 + (−0.21) = −1.1 hours per week (p-value=
0.005).
Combining these estimates allows us to comment on the overall labor-market effects of
23Standard errors were obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications with sampling at the household level.
P-value is based on normal distribution. See Table A4.
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the PFD and should serve as a baseline for future implementations of basic income. The
calculations above indicate that the decline for the average women in our sample is greater
in absolute value than the average increase among males in our sample, and persists for a
longer period after the disbursement. The aggregate impact on labor depends on the relative
number of males and females in the population, and the number of months that the effects
persists. Applying our estimated average unconditional changes to a population with the
proportion of men and women that we observe in our sample, about 53% female, we observe
an unconditional average reduction of 0.4 hours worked per week in the three months after
the disbursement, followed by a 0.6 (= 0.53×−1.13) hour reduction for another two months
On average, this reduction amounts to a 1.6% contraction of the labor market based on the
sample average of 30 hours per week in post-disbursement months, which persists for about
five months following the disbursement.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to our understanding of the short-term labor market responses to
universal cash transfers. Using the timing of disbursements and annual fluctuations in dis-
bursement size of an unconditional and nearly universal lump-sum payment, Alaska’s Per-
manent Fund Dividend, we find evidence of both a positive labor demand response and a
negative labor supply response to universal cash transfers in the short-run. We estimate that
a $1,000 increase in the size of the per person PFD increases the probability of employment
among men by 1.7 percent over the months following the disbursement, which we interpret
as direct empirical evidence that universal transfers can induce demand shocks that increase
the demand for labor. This is critical for designing UBI-related policy, because it suggests
that the universal nature of UBI leads to positive demand shocks that partially offset any
negative impact on labor supply.
On the other hand, we estimate that a $1,000 increase in the size of the per person
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PFD leads to a reduction of 1.25 hours per week (a four-percent decrease) among employed
women in the months following the disbursement, with no corresponding extensive-margin
response. However, we find that decreases in hours of work among women are concentrated
among those who are younger, lower wage earners, and those with young children in the
household. This heterogeneity is consistent with the idea that average labor supply responses
to universal transfers are likely to be smaller than responses to targeted transfers, and could
help reconcile modest differences between our results and other cash transfers such as EITC.
Because of both the heterogeneity in the intensive margin responses among women as well as
the positive demand shock induced by the universal nature of the disbursement, conclusions
from research on non-universal transfers do not necessarily provide insights into potential
labor-market effects from universal transfer programs.
Altogether, our estimates suggest that a $1,000 increase in the size of the per person PFD
induces a contraction in the amount of labor that is 1.6% of the size of the labor market in
the months that follow, which is driven by transitory reductions in hours rather than labor
force exits.
While we find our estimated effects on aggregate labor outcomes to be useful for evaluat-
ing the overall effects of the PFD, there are several caveats to consider. First, our estimates
are specific to the aggregate hours of work, and there may be variation in the aggregate
hours across industry or wage levels. Second, the overall impacts calculated here are taken
from a particular sample and should not necessarily be applied to the rest of the population.
Similarly, the size of the PFD is small, relative to what a full UBI program may look like, so
caution should be taken before extrapolating results to larger payments. Lastly, the impact
of the disbursement persists for about five months. Further, because the disbursement is in
the fall, the contraction comes during the portion of the year when the Alaskan labor mar-
ket is relatively small. Taking these last two points together, the size of the labor market
contraction induced by a $1,000 increase in the per person PFD is actually much smaller
(approximately 0.7%) on an annual basis.
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It is also important to note that calculating the average change in hours, as we do here,
might overlook other potential benefits from the re-allocation of time from the labor market
toward household work. In particular, the increase in employment is largely driven by single
men with no children in the household. On the other hand, the decline in labor comes through
a labor supply response, which is strongest among young women with young children in the
household. This re-allocation could have societal benefits outside of the labor market, as
the reduction concentrated in households with young children could have secondary effects
on child development and human capital development (Bettinger et al., 2014; Cunha et al.,
2006; Coneus et al., 2012).
Finally, one potential avenue for future research is to confirm our results using administra-
tive data, which could better identify PFD recipients and potentially allow for an improved
research design to disentangle the supply and demand side responses. In addition, the het-
erogeneous responses uncovered in this paper raise important questions about the long-term
effects of universal cash transfers. In particular, a holistic view on the effects of uncondi-
tional transfers should also consider substitution patterns between time spent in the labor
force and in other activities.
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Figure 1: Hours of Work by Month
Note: Panels A, B, and C show average hours among those employed calculated from the CPS, weighted by final respondent
weights. Hours are averaged to the state-year-month level, then aggregated accordingly by month. Each panel contains two
lines: one graphs the average hours per week in each month for Alaska, and the other graphs the average hours of work in all
other states. Panel A contains observations for men only. Panel B contains hours for unmarried and non-cohabiting women.
Panel C contains observations for married or cohabiting women. Panel D graphs monthly employment in Alaska, and the
average monthly employment in the average of all other states. Employment levels from BLS data. Employment is measured
as percentage change from January of the corresponding year, and averaged by month.
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Figure 2: Employment by Month
Note: From BLS employment level data. Percent change in employment, relative to January of same year. Averaged by state
over 1994 - 2016. High PFD years are 1996 - 2002, 2007 - 2008, and 2014 - 2015. In High PFD years the per person
disbursement was over $1,700 in 2016 dollars. In Low PFD Years the disbursement was less than $1,600 in 2016 dollars.
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Figure 3: Hours Differences in High vs. Low PFD Years
Note: CPS average hours among those employed, weighted by final respondent weights. Average to the state-year-month
level, then aggregated accordingly to high and low PFD years. The figures display differences between the average hours in
high and low PFD years for each month. Each panel contains four lines: One for Alaska respondents, and another line for
each of the three control group averages. Panel A contains observations for the sample of men. Panel B contains observations
for unmarried/non-cohabiting women. Panel C contains observations from married/cohabiting women. High PFD years are
1996 - 2002, 2007 - 2008, and 2014 - 2015. In High PFD years the per person disbursement was over $1,700 in 2016 dollars. In
Low PFD Years the disbursement was less than $1,600 in 2016 dollars. The states with most comparable seasonality are MT,
WY, SD, and ME, and the energy states are based on Snead (2009).
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Figure 4: Estimates by Month
Note: This figure displays month-specific estimates for the effect of an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD on hours and
employment in Alaska, i.e. each dot represents a β̂m from Equation 1, which are the coefficients on size of the PFD, PFDy ,
interacted with month dummies. August is the omitted month in each regression. The dotted vertical lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Table 1: PFD ($1,000s)
Prob(Employed) (Hours | Employed)
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post X PFD(1000s) 0.017** -0.006 -0.273 -1.265***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.354) (0.334)
Observations 79,157 88,501 68,015 64,446
Notes: Estimates of the coefficient on the Post interaction with PFD size
as shown in Equation 2, i.e. β̂. Only includes Alaska observations. In this
specification, the per person size of the PFD in the given year, measured
in $1,000s, is interacted with the post variable. The coefficients for that
interaction term are reported in the table. All regressions weighted by the
individual final weight. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Figure 5: Placebo Tests by Month
Note: This figure displays month-specific estimates for the effect of an additional $1,000 in the per-person PFD on hours and
employment in Alaska, i.e. each dot represents a β̂m from Equation 1, which are the coefficients on size of the PFD, PFDy ,
interacted with month dummies. August is the omitted month in each regression. As a placebo test, we repeat this exercise
for each state and D.C., and include the 5th to 95th percentile range in this figure as the dotted vertical line for each month.
33
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357230
Table 2: Heterogeneity by Work Status (PFD $1,000s)
Panel A: Employment
Men Women
Full Part Full Part
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post X PFD -0.006 0.006 -0.021** 0.021**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 68,015 68,015 64,446 64,446
Panel B: Hours per Week
Men Women
Full Part Full Part
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post X PFD -0.060 -1.094 -1.084*** -0.001
(0.349) (0.856) (0.322) (0.448)
Observations 63,876 4,139 49,772 14,674
Notes: Estimated effect of the size of the PFD, measured in $1,000s,
on employment and hours of work. In this specification, the size
of the PFD is interacted with the post variable. The coefficients
for that interaction term are reported in the table. Includes Alaska
observations only. All amounts are measured in 2016 dollars. Effects
on type of employment in Panel (A) are estimated by restricting to
the sample of employed respondents and using a dummy variable
for full- or part-time employment as the outcome. They should be
interpreted as relative shifts in employment. Effects in Panel (B)
for hours of work are estimated by restricting the sample to those
employed full- or part-time, so the effects are directly comparable to
the main estimates. All regressions weighted by the individual final
weight. Standard errors are clustered by household. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3: Men - Heterogeneity by Age and Children (PFD $1,000s)
Panel A: Male Employment
All Marital Status Age Has Children Has Children LT 5
Single Married 20 - 30 31 - 55 No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post X PFD 0.017** 0.025 0.012* 0.019 0.016** 0.027** 0.007 0.022*** -0.009
(0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Observations 79,157 21,095 58,062 12,221 66,936 35,703 43,454 65,005 14,152
Panel B: Male Hours per Week
All Marital Status Age Has Children Has Children LT 5
Single Married 20 - 30 31 - 55 No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post X PFD -0.273 -0.274 -0.276 -1.002 -0.137 -0.363 -0.193 -0.354 0.005
(0.354) (0.655) (0.416) (0.745) (0.395) (0.505) (0.484) (0.388) (0.812)
Observations 68,015 16,365 51,650 10,450 57,565 29,160 38,855 55,283 12,732
Notes: Estimates of the coefficient on the Post interaction with PFD size as shown in Equation 2 for different subsamples. In
this specification, the per person size of the PFD in the given year, measured in $1,000s, is interacted with the post variable. The
coefficients for that interaction term are reported in the table. Includes Alaska observations only. All amounts are measured in
2016 dollars. Column (1) shows the main estimate from Table 1. All regressions weighted by the individual final weight. Standard
errors are clustered by household. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4: Women - Heterogeneity by Age and Children (PFD $1,000s)
Panel A: Female Employment
All Marital Status Age Has Children Has Children LT 5
Single Married 20 - 30 31 - 55 No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post X PFD -0.006 -0.015 -0.002 -0.019 -0.003 0.002 -0.012 0.001 -0.038*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021)
Observations 88,501 20,624 67,877 18,037 70,464 32,158 56,343 69,515 18,986
Panel B: Female Hours per Week
All Marital Status Age Has Children Has Children LT 5
Single Married 20 - 30 31 - 55 No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post X PFD -1.265*** -1.126* -1.353*** -2.142*** -1.111*** -1.064** -1.579*** -1.149*** -2.147***
(0.334) (0.589) (0.395) (0.715) (0.375) (0.509) (0.429) (0.358) (0.829)
Observations 64,446 15,954 48,492 11,917 52,529 25,099 39,347 53,520 10,926
Notes: Estimates of the coefficient on the Post interaction with PFD size as shown in Equation 2 for different subsamples. In
this specification, the per person size of the PFD in the given year, measured in $1,000s, is interacted with the post variable. The
coefficients for that interaction term are reported in the table. Includes Alaska observations only. All amounts are measured in
2016 dollars. Column (1) shows the main estimate from Table 1. All regressions weighted by the individual final weight. Standard
errors are clustered by household. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity in Hours by Wage Tercile
Note: This figure displays the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals for the effect of the PFD on hours of work in the
full, male, and female samples by predicted wage tercile. In this specification, the per person size of the PFD in the given
year, measured in $1,000s, is interacted with the post variable. The coefficients for that interaction term are the estimates
shown in the figure. All amounts are measured in 2016 dollars. Terciles are based on reported wages for respondents with
non-missing wages, and are based on predicted wages for other observations. Covariates used for predicted wages are age by
month quadratic functions, age by year quadratic functions, education level by year dummy variables, education by month
dummy variables, part-time work by month dummy variables, broad industry by occupation category dummies, broad
industry by month dummies, broad industry by year dummies, and occupation by month and year dummy variables.
Standard errors are clustered by household. All regressions weighted by the individual final weight.
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D. Malacrino, S. Pérez, S. Saavedra, J. Rios, P. Tebaldi, and A. Villacorta (2016). The
Long-Term Effects of Cash Assistance. Technical report.
Robins, P. K. (1985). A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four Negative
Income Tax. Technical Report 4.
Sila, U. and R. M. Sousa (2014). Windfall gains and labour supply: evidence from the
European household panel. IZA Journal of Labor Economics .
Snead, M. C. (2009). Are the Energy States Still Energy States? Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Economic Review Fourth Quarter, 43–68.
Thigpen, D. E. (2016). Universal Income What Is It, and Is It Right for the U.S.? Technical
report, Roosevelt Institute.
Watson, B., M. Guettabi, and M. Reimer (2019). Universal Cash and Crime. The Review
of Economics and Statistics Forthcoming.
Yang, T.-T. (2018). Family Labor Supply and the Timing of Cash Transfers: Evidence from
the Earned Income Tax Credit. Journal of Human Resources 53 (2), 445–473.
40
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357230
Appendix
(Not Intended for Publication)
41
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357230
Table A1: PFD Summary Statistics (1994-2016)
Year AK Pop. Pct. Applied Pct. Paid Dividend (2016 $) Date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2016 739,828 91.2% 86.3% $1,022.00 6-Oct
2015 737,625 92.0% 87.0% $2,098.23 1-Oct
2014 735,601 92.0% 86.6% $1,910.27 2-Oct
2013 736,399 91.3% 86.1% $927.04 3-Oct
2012 732,298 92.8% 87.6% $917.77 4-Oct
2011 722,190 93.9% 89.3% $1,252.82 6-Oct
2010 710,231 94.4% 89.8% $1,409.63 7-Oct
2009 692,314 95.4% 90.3% $1,460.14 8-Oct
2008 679,720 95.4% 90.7% $3,644.03 12-Sep
2007 674,510 94.1% 89.0% $1,914.91 3-Oct
2006 670,053 93.9% 88.8% $1,317.81 4-Oct
2005 663,253 95.4% 90.1% $1,039.34 12-Oct
2004 656,834 96.1% 91.3% $1,168.67 12-Oct
2003 647,747 96.6% 92.0% $1,444.64 8-Oct
2002 640,544 97.0% 92.1% $2,055.49 9-Oct
2001 632,241 98.1% 92.8% $2,507.44 10-Oct
2000 627,533 98.7% 93.0% $2,737.09 4-Oct
1999 622,000 95.3% 92.2% $2,549.59 6-Oct
1998 617,082 94.8% 91.7% $2,268.78 7-Oct
1997 609,655 94.4% 91.1% $1,938.75 8-Oct
1996 605,212 93.5% 90.3% $1,729.53 9-Oct
1995 601,581 93.9% 90.2% $1,559.53 6-Oct
1994 600,622 93.2% 89.1% $1,593.36 12-Oct
Notes: PFD dates and amounts come from Alaska Department of Revenue’s Permanent
Fund Dividend Annual reports. The date is the date of the first direct deposits for that
year. Dividend amounts are measured in 2016 dollars. Pct. Applied refers to the percent
of the state population that submitted an application and Pct. Paid refers to the percent
of the population that received a dividend that year. Some applicant may not meet
the baseline eligibility requirements. In addition, there may be involuntary (e.g. child
support or uncollected government fees) or voluntary (e.g. tax exempt college savings or
charitable contribution) garnishments to disbursements.
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Table A2: Alaska Summary (Apr - Aug)
Men Women
(1) (2) (4) (5)
High PFD Low PFD High PFD Low PFD
Hours 37.44 36.61 24.89 24.37
(22.67) (22.44) (21.32) (20.86)
Employed 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.72
(0.33) (0.34) (0.44) (0.45)
Num. Children in HH 1.17 1.11 1.34 1.27
(1.32) (1.33) (1.31) (1.31)
Num. Children lt5 in HH 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.29
(0.57) (0.57) (0.61) (0.61)
Less than HS 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21)
HS 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.26
(0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44)
Some College 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45)
College Degree 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.32
(0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47)
Advanced Degree 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
Age 40.82 40.64 39.18 39.44
(8.89) (9.35) (9.43) (9.66)
White 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.78
(0.38) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42)
Black 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Hispanic 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Am. Indian 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10
(0.29) (0.26) (0.33) (0.30)
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Multiple Races 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
(0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20)
Married 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.75
(0.44) (0.45) (0.42) (0.43)
Unemployment Rate 6.75 7.32 6.75 7.32
(0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.43)
Crude Oil Price 45.09 59.61 44.54 59.13
(36.30) (31.83) (36.24) (31.62)
Observations 15902 17162 17319 19741
Notes: Mean and standard deviations of each subsample. Married includes married, but not
cohabiting, couples. Co-habiting couples are not included. Comparing high and low PFD years
in January - August only. High PFD years are those with a PFD greater than $1700: 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008, 2014, 2015. Low PFD years had a PFD less
than $1600. The average PFD among observations in high PFD years is $2,305, and the average
among observations in low PFD years is $1,259. All amounts are measured in 2016 dollars. Final
respondent weights are used.
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Figure A1: Treatment Densities for Non-Alaska States
Note: Each panel shows the density of treatment effects from estimating the effect of an additional $1,000 in the per-person
PFD on states that did not actually receive the treatment. The density in each panel includes an estimate for each other state
and D.C. The dashed vertical lines are at the point of the main estimates of the effect of an additional $1,000 in the per-person
PFD on labor market outcomes in Alaska (see Table 1). The solid vertical lines are at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the
distribution of placebo effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post X High -0.27 -0.20 -0.04 -0.52
(0.35) (0.57) (0.56) (0.58)




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post X High -1.27*** -2.01*** -0.38 -1.28**
(0.33) (0.53) (0.49) (0.54)
Observations 64,446 21,621 21,519 21,306
Notes: Estimated effect of the size of the PFD, measured in
$1,000s, on hours of work by wage tercile. In this specification,
the size of the PFD is interacted with the post variable. The
coefficients for that interaction term are reported in the table.
Column (1) shows the main estimates from Table 1. Columns 2 -
4 show estimates specific to each predicted wage tercile. Terciles
are based on reported wages for cases with non-missing wages,
and are based on predicted wages for other observations. Covari-
ates used for predicted wages are age by month quadratic func-
tions, age by year quadratic functions, education level by year
dummy variables, education by month dummy variables, part-
time work by month dummy variables, broad industry by occu-
pation category dummies, broad industry by month dummies,
broad industry by year dummies, and occupation by month and
year dummy variables. All regressions weighted by the individ-
ual final weight. Standard errors are clustered by household.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A4: Bootstrap Estimates PFD ($1,000s)
Men Women
Total Employment Hours Total Employment Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β̂ 0.444 0.017 -0.286 -1.133 -0.006 -1.252
(SE) (0.406) (0.007) (0.347) (0.407) (0.009) (0.339)
t-stat 1.094 2.581 -0.824 -2.782 -0.667 -3.698
P-value 0.274 0.010 0.410 0.005 0.504 0.000
Notes: The first row displays the main estimates of the coefficient on the Post interaction
with PFD size as shown in Equation 2, i.e. β̂, and the total effects. The Employment and
Hours estimates are the bootstrapped version of the estimates in Table 1. The Total estimates
are calculated as discussed in Section 6. The standard errors are estimated as the standard
deviation of the bootstrap estimates with sampling done at the household level and based on
1000 bootstrap repetitions. We use the normal distribution to calculate p-values.
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